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Abstract 
The article provides insights into the driving forces that underpin new forms of political 
participation. Digital technologies offer opportunities for engaging in a wide range of civically-
oriented activities, whether liking or sharing political content, joining online political 
communities or joining discussions, each can contribute to deeper democratic engagement 
and, for the individual, act as a pathway towards further civic participation. Conventional acts 
of political participation, demonstrating, petitioning and voting, are argued to be driven 
primarily by intrinsic motivations relating to self-efficacy and empowerment as the individual 
feels they can have influence over decision makers. Little research explores whether similar 
motivations drive participation in less conventional acts, as well as whether mobilisation 
attempts via social media by peers or political organisations mediate those motivations. 
Drawing on data from a survey among a representative sample of the UK electorate, we find 
the offline and online spheres of agency as still fairly distinct. Intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations both matter but extrinsic motivations, following norms of behaviour within 
networks and supporting the activities of peers, have the strongest explanatory power 
independent of the sphere of activity. The mediating effect of mobilisation tactics has a 
minimal effect on extrinsic motivations, online or offline, but online intrinsic motivations lose 
their explanatory power. This finding suggests online political acts are carried out due to 
mobilisation, although as intrinsic factors offer little explanatory power these acts may lack 
meaning to the individual. We also found that campaign organisations are the most powerful 
mobilisers perhaps suggesting social media users are most likely to perform simple acts in 
support of non-contentious causes. 
 
 
  
Introduction 
Political participation can no longer be purely defined in terms of high effort, offline acts with 
"the intent or effect of influencing government action – either directly by affecting the making 
or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who 
make those policies." (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995: 38). Political participation now 
covers an array of forms which includes the acts Verba et al. describe, such as voting, 
petitioning governments, contacting elected representatives and taking part in 
demonstrations, as well as non-conventional acts performed using digital technologies which 
appear geared more towards expressing a view, supportive or otherwise, than influencing 
decision makers (De Zúñiga et al., 2012; Bimber & Copeland, 2013; Gibson & Cantijoch, 
2013). Most conventional acts can be performed using digital platforms, however social 
media not only facilitates participation in its conventional understanding but also in creating 
or joining communities which transcend state or national boundaries, starting or contributing 
to discussions, advertising support for causes, and promoting the work of a range of political 
organisations and campaigns in national and global dimension. Digital technologies provide 
a range of new means for engaging in civically-oriented forms of behaviour.  
Political organisations encourage supporters to engage in these forms of behaviour via 
digital platforms. Political parties, non-governmental and civil society organisations attempt 
to draw citizens into promoting their campaigns, harnessing their dedication to a cause or 
the organisation (Author et al., 2015). The interplay of attitudes towards a participatory act, 
the organisation promoting that act, and beliefs and positions elicited through persuasive 
communication represent highly complex cognitive processes (Leighley, 1995). The 
complexity is increased in the digital age, a broader range of factors can heighten the 
propensity to take part in forms of participation, and research suggests the use of digital 
technologies can provide pathways into higher cognitive engagement and participation (De 
Zúñiga et al, 2012). Little research, however, captures how stimuli received via digital 
technologies impact on the inclinations of individuals to create the conditions for political 
participation. While much research has explored who participates and what they do, there is 
a gap in understanding the power of mobilisation tactics.  
Our research explores what motivates citizens to pursue suites of participation, specifically 
testing the power of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations and the extent these are mediated by 
persuasive communication. Given the evidence showing a decline in participation in a range 
of forms of civic life (Martin, 2012), it is crucial to understand what stimulates citizens to 
perform civically-oriented actions. Our research is conducted within a context when political 
engagement should be high. Elections are usually times of high politicization of the UK 
public sphere (Swanson & Mancini, 1996) with evidence that digital technology expands the 
public sphere and fuels engagement (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). The 2015 UK political scene, 
in the aftermath of the European parliamentary election (May 2014), the referendum on 
independence for Scotland (September 2014), and the close proximity of opinion polls 
showing deadlock between the major parties, suggests an atmosphere for even greater 
political engagement. The media focus on the continued rise of Euroscepticism, with a right-
wing anti-EU party winning most seats in the European parliament initiated a debate on the 
UK’s membership of the EU onto the election agenda. Controversy also surrounded the 
nature of the devolution settlement for Scotland following the close victory of the No 
campaign and the opening of debates over parity between the four nations of the UK. The 
ramping up of media speculation regarding the outcome of the forthcoming contest, and high 
chance of protracted coalition negotiations, meant voter turnout was predicted to be high. 
While an unusual set of circumstances, this context of high interest and potentially higher 
participation allows us to determine what levels of participation actually existed and what 
motivational factors determined participation. This study is based on data  drawn from a 
representative survey of UK citizens designed to explore the extent of participation across a 
range of acts and the motivations for performing each action. We proceed to conceptualise 
motivations and mobilisation prior to providing details on the methodology, presenting 
findings and offering pointers for further research. 
Motivations and Mobilisation 
Motivations to perform any activity can be broadly defined as intrinsic, pleasure-seeking, or 
extrinsic, for the benefit of others. In each case persuasive communication can engender 
beliefs that an action can lead to the desired impact. Within the context of UK politics, 
organisations seek to persuade citizens to support the organisation, join its campaigns and 
provide financial and physical resources (Fisher et al., 2014).  Attempts at mobilising 
supporters are highly strategic (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993) and have accelerated 
significantly as a result of the widespread adoption of social media (Vaccari, 2013). 
Organisations  not only seek to mobilise supporters directly, but also encourage existing 
activists to mobilise those within their digital networks. The revised two-step flow model for 
political campaigning (Norris & Curtice, 2008) demonstrates how organisations utilise the 
affordances of social media to mobilise their supporters to, in turn, persuade and mobilise 
their followers. Social media allows any user to play the role of activist, even on a single 
occasion, they can post content about a political cause or issue, be it their own content, 
content from other users, content from media or content from political organisations. Each of 
these actions, by intention or by accident, can have a mobilising impact on people within 
their online networks, with the greater the size of a network the greater the opportunity to be 
mobilised (De Zúñiga et al., 2014). Theocharis (2015: 5) uses the term digitally networked 
participation to describe “the act of activating one’s personal networks via digital media with 
the aim to mobilize others for social or political purposes [which] constitutes a mode of 
participation with different manifestations”.  The effectiveness of differing mobilisation 
practices is however largely unknown. It might be expected that such tactics would only be 
successful among the most dedicated supporters, yet the ubiquity of cues to act may mean 
social media is able to accelerate participation levels across a wider milieu of users. The 
extent that digitally networked participation occurs and the interplay between motivations 
and mobilisation tactics is the question at the heart of this research.  
Motivations, as explained by self-determination theory, represent the interplay between 
personal attitudes towards a specific action and external persuasion (Ryan & Deci, 2000a). 
Intrinsic motivations hinge upon personal attitudes which provide hedonic evaluations of 
actions (Shang et al., 2005) assessing for example whether an act is interesting, enjoyable 
or providing satisfaction (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). Extrinsic motivations however suggest 
people seek the approval of and rewards from others (Deci, 1971) and, using experimental 
conditions, it is proven that the greater reward the higher the likelihood of action (Deci et al., 
1999). Subsequent studies highlight the importance of ‘bottom-up’ encouragement from 
peers (Vallerand & Lalande, 2011) or the expectation of gaining approval from peers 
(Madden et al., 1992), suggesting the importance of extrinsic, communal (Omoto et al., 
2010) or prosocial (Grant, 2008) motivations are important in explaining engagement in civic. 
In contrast research shows for some activists the dominant motivations are intrinsic, seeking 
enjoyment, self-realization and personal well-being (Klar & Kasser, 2009). These studies hint 
further that intrinsic and extrinsic motivations combine to govern behaviour but the strength 
of each set of motivations may vary dependent upon the behaviour. Ryan and Deci (2000b) 
recognise that where there are combinations of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, for 
example when an expectation of rewards makes a task personally enjoyable and fulfilling, an 
action is more likely to be taken. Degli-Antoni (2009) found volunteers seek to have a 
positive effect on others through their efforts, and feel self-fulfilled; however they are also 
motivated by gaining recognition from peers and earning social capital. The suggestion is 
therefore that while differing actions may elide with differing levels of both intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations each set of motivations will impact upon the other, earned social capital 
leads to feelings of self-fulfilment for example, an individual will be most likely to perform an 
action when they have strong intrinsic and/or extrinsic motivations. The strength of 
motivations may also be highly dependent on the mobilisation factors that spur an individual 
into a particular behaviour. 
The extent people become motivated through the mobilization strategies of political 
organisations or peers within their networks via social media is an issue of some debate. 
The mobilization thesis argues that access to digital technologies has the capacity to draw 
new participants into civic life (Stanley & Wear, 2004), particularly among younger citizens 
(Hirzalla et al., 2010). This thesis suggests extrinsic motivations are likely to dominate. In 
contrast other studies show digital technologies reinforce the patterns of behaviour of 
existing participants and so offer complementarity; strengthening commitment by providing 
further means to pursue forms of activism (Dutta‐Bergman, 2006). The reinforcement and 
complementarity theses suggest intrinsic motivations would be most dominant. In reality 
studies often find mixed results with digital technologies facilitating reinforcement and 
mobilization among differing groups of users of digital platforms (Nam, 2012). The complex 
decision making processes informing behavioural decisions are a recognised phenomenon 
in consumer behaviour literature (Madden, Ellen & Ajzen, 1992) but has been strikingly 
absent from discussions of civically-oriented actions. Without in-depth studies at the level of 
the individual it is impossible to gauge whether intrinsic motivations, supporting 
reinforcement and complementarity theses, or extrinsic motivations, supporting the 
mobilisation thesis, govern any specific decision to act. However, studying a large group of 
individuals one would expect that to differing extents both sets of motivations would be 
important albeit at different levels dependent upon whether the individuals act due to 
personal reasons or based on cues they receive.  We therefore argue that: 
H1. Regardless of the form or sphere of participation we will find a positive influence from 
both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations on political participation regardless of other 
explanatory factors. 
Motivations, mobilisation and participation 
Research on election campaigns (Author, 2014) and the campaigns of civic society 
organisations (Enjolras et al., 2013; Guo & Saxton, 2014) show both build community 
spaces, encourage supporters to join those spaces and then seek to mobilise those 
supporters to perform actions to benefit the organisation and its campaign. Social media has 
become a significant battleground for all political organisations, in particular civic society 
organisations (Acensio & Sun, 2015). Studies over the two last decades have largely treated 
online and offline as two distinct spheres of activity, although research has found hyper 
active citizens taking part in both offline and digital environments, there is still a significant 
number of studies suggesting the existence of participation patterns taking place within one 
single sphere (Polat, 2005; Quintelier & Vissers, 2008; De Zúñiga & Valenzuela, 2011; 
Vissers & Stolle, 2014).  
While debates rage, we follow a direction in research which argues “a distinction between 
online and offline political activity should be maintained” (Vissers & Stolle, 2014: 950). The 
distinction chimes with arguments suggesting that as online mobilisation leads only to online 
forms of participation, people’s propensity to participate becomes channelled into activities 
which are shallow and effortless (Morozov, 2012). Yet research consistently shows online 
mobilisation has a lower if not a minimal effect in encouraging offline forms of participation 
(Quintelier & Vissers, 2008). In the UK, studies largely reinforce this finding (Ward et al, 
2003; Di Gennaro & Dutton, 2006) although more recent research has found more complex 
suites of participation exist where the online and offline spheres are bridged (Gibson & 
Cantijoch, 2013). Again, however, there is no indication of the motivations underpinning 
suites of activities. Studies show online forms of political engagement, such as active 
information seeking online (De Zúñiga et al., 2009; De Zúñiga et al., 2012) and goal oriented 
forum use (Gibson & Cantijoch, 2013; Semaan et al., 2015), positively predict further 
participation online and offline, however these studies were not designed to understand why. 
The traditional view of political participation, as activities directed to influencing the actions of 
composition of a legislature, offer a view of participants as feeling empowered and act in 
order to realize their potential as citizens. The crucial factor which appears to drive political 
participation is commitment, to a cause or organisation, which suggests intrinsic motivations, 
relating to the pursuit of self-fulfilment and self-realization drive behaviour. We therefore 
hypothesise: 
H2a. Intrinsic motivations will have greater explanatory power over participation occurring 
within the offline sphere (as this involves greater effort and resources, and therefore 
planning, so personal attitudes towards the action and its outcomes will dominate)  
While intrinsic motivations are considered crucial where an action involves effort, this may 
not be the same within online environments. The interactive affordances of digital platforms 
have been found to offer extrinsic motivations for participation. Studies find that while much 
social activity is geared around being entertained or informed, those who join Facebook 
communities do so in order to socialize, and enhance their reputation among peers (Park et 
al., 2009). Similarly interaction, whatever the subject matter, within communities is 
undertaken in pursuit of social capital (McClurg, 2003). Indeed the primary motivations of 
bloggers are to influence others and build a reputation (Ekdale, 2010). While these factors 
relate to intrinsic motivations, such as increasing self-esteem, the main motivations are 
extrinsic. In order to earn social capital there must be an expectation of rewards from others 
suggesting external encouragement will be an important spur to action (Kriesi, 2008). The 
role of organisations as mobilizing forces could therefore be crucial, in particular through 
empowering supporters by providing means to complement commitment through activism 
(Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001). Mobilisation tactics, therefore, are likely to make appeals which 
bolster intrinsic motivations by engendering feelings of self-efficacy (Condon & Helleque, 
2013).  
Defining suites of participation is problematic, particular given that it is becoming less 
possible to separate the online and offline spheres of activity1. For example petitioning or 
lobbying elected representatives is an action that can be performed face to face, via mail, 
email or even social media. Studies have broken down online participation into clusters, for 
example receiving news, acting as party activists, posting political comments or discussing 
politics and contacting representatives (Gibson & Cantijoch, 2013). While research drawing 
on self-determination theory suggests there are relationships between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations (Ryan & Deci, 2000a; 2000b), research on online participation suggests extrinsic 
motivations are dominant and likely to feed intrinsic motivations. We therefore argue:  
H2b.  Extrinsic motivations will have greater explanatory power over participation occurring 
within the online sphere (as mobilisation and action can occur almost simultaneously). 
Social media also facilitates accidental exposure to news and political content and permits 
all users to publicly show their agreement or disagreement through posting content and 
commenting. In terms of Facebook’s likes and shares or Twitter’s retweet function this can 
involve nothing more than a single click. Exposure to political content from peers or directly 
from organizations or activists both predict online and offline participation, viewing content 
shared by peers is a stronger predictor of online participation, while direct communication 
from an organisation predicts online and offline participation (Tang & Lee, 2013). These 
findings build upon studies which have shown accidental exposure to news can lead to a 
heightened propensity to participate (De Zúñiga et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2013; Diehl et al., 
2015) and at the very least can reduce gaps in the levels of interest and engagement 
(Valeriani & Vaccari, 2015). Social pressure, applied by peers via social media, to act in a 
certain way is equally seen as a predictor of participation, in particular when an action is 
seen to have broader societal benefits (Panagopoulos, 2013) and applied via “specific 
networks of informal sociability” (Lowndes, 2004: 61). In other words close peers in closed or 
bounded networks such as friends groups or support communities provide the extrinsic 
motivations that can drive participation. Studies of the effects of social media usage on the 
propensity to participate from different perspectives arrive at contrasting results ranging from 
strong to adverse effects (Theocharis & Lowe, 2015). Some studies highlight that the form of 
                                                          
1
 In order to understand what behavioural clusters exist across the spheres within our sample 
correlations (Appendix: Table 1) and confirmatory factor analysis (Appendix: Table 2) were performed 
delivering two clusters which map into online and offline spheres of activity; this excludes signing 
petitions which maps to both clusters. 
social media usage matters, for example positive experiences from engaging in issue-
specific activism increases the propensity to participate further (Vraga et al, 2015) while 
others suggest it is the composition of an individual’s network (Lupton et al, 2014), its size, 
interactive dynamics and heterogeneity (Huckfeldt, 2014). The inconsistent results 
demonstrate the importance of asking about a range of participatory actions, their 
motivations and the forms of mobilisation received in order to fully distinguish what forms of 
mobilisation stimulate which motivations. We therefore hypothesise: 
H3a. The predictive strength of intrinsic motivations will not be mediated by the mobilisation 
from political parties, non-electoral organisations and peers.  
H3b. The predictive strength of extrinsic motivations will be mediated by mobilisation from 
political parties, non-electoral organisations and peers. 
Methodology 
There is a general lack of data on the motivations driving political participation and the 
mediation of motivations by mobilisation via social media. We ran an online survey with 
Opinium Research on a sample of 18+ year olds representative for the United Kingdom 
N=2037 (the Northern Ireland respondents were excluded due to the missing variables 
within party identification questions leaving the sample of  N = 1982). The survey was 
conducted one month prior to the start of the six-week 2015 parliamentary election campaign 
24-27 February 2015. The questionnaire was sent out to a stratified sample of those 
registered on the Opinium Research database (40 000 e-mails), the stratification (by age, 
gender, region and social class) was used to ensure representativeness. The CAWI method 
was employed with the response rate of 29 per cent (out of 7126 invitations sent).  
Dependent variables 
Following Quintelier & Vissers (2008) and Vissers & Stolle (2014), as well as given that our 
respondents’ reported behaviour map to two distinct suites (see Appendix), we use the 
spheres of activity, offline or online, as a dependent variable to ascertain what differences 
can be found between motivations within the offline and online environments. 
The index of offline and online political activities are based on questions asking if in the 
last 12 months they have performed any of the following: [offline] “boycotted a company or 
product” N= 347 (17.5%), “joined/rejoined a political party” N=119 (6%), “contacted an 
elective representative” N=314 (15.8%) (even if this activity could be perform offline and 
online in EFA analysis it loaded lower than .3 on the online index), “taken part in a 
demonstration” N=130 (6.6%); [online] “commented about politics on social media” N= 320 
(16%), “follow political non-governmental political organization or charity on SM” N=278 
(14%), “shared political content on SM” N= 243 (12%), “follow political party/MP/candidate 
on SM” N=199 (10%). Further, based on Confirmatory Factor Analysis coefficients (please 
see Tables 2 in Appendix), the questions were recoded into two indexes:  offline political 
participation α = .782 (M=.47 SD=.89); and online political participation α = .714 (M=.51 
SD=.89). 
Independent variables 
Motivations: for each of the political activities respondents indicated the level ((4) strongly 
agree to (0) strongly disagree) to which motivations are driving their engagement in each 
activity. Two indices were created drawing on Ajzen and colleagues’ theory of reasoned 
action and theory of planned behaviour (Madden et al., 1992) which highlight the importance 
of behavioural beliefs (underpinning intrinsic motivations) and normative beliefs 
(underpinning extrinsic motivations). Our survey questions were adapted for the political 
participation context based on procedures developed by Ajzen and publicly available at 
http://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpb.html.  
The Intrinsic motivation index (IMI) is based on a combination of feeling good, having a 
positive self-image and feelings of self-efficacy factors which contribute to self-satisfaction 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000a). The following questions were asked for each political activity “I 
personally feel good for taking part in this activity”, “I feel that this activity is the sort of thing 
that my friends and family would respect me for”, “I feel I can influence others”, “I feel I can 
influence policy makers”. The Extrinsic motivation index (EMI) “Others benefits from people 
like me taking part in this activity”, “A number of my friends are also taking part in this 
activity”, “I feel inspired by my friends to take part in this activity” link to the instrumentalist 
nature of these motivations being concerned with benefitting others as well as expecting 
rewards through conforming with norms prevailing within peer networks (Deci, 1971). 
Indexes were calculated separately for offline and online participation: IMI for offline activities 
(16 items, range 0-64, α =.963, M = 27.4, SD=16.5 ); IMI for online activities (16 items, range 
0-64, α =.975, M=23.6, SD=17); EMI for offline activities (12 items, range 0-48, α =.946, 
M=18.6, SD=11.9 ); EMI for online activities (12 items, range 0-48, α =.961, M=17.2, 
SD=12.6).  
Mobilisation / encouragement: frequency ((4) frequently to (0) never) of encountering the 
following mobilisation: “I see friends sharing and linking content on social media’ or’ I 
received encouragement via social media from friends to like or join political 
campaigns”(M=2.49, SD=2.53, max=8), “I received encouragement via social media from 
political parties to like or join their campaigns” (M=1.08, SD=1.3, max=4), “I received 
encouragement via social media from campaign organization to like or join their campaigns” 
(M=1.25, SD=1.4, max=4).  
Control variables 
Socio-demographic variables: gender with female (53%, reference group); age continuous 
variable (M=46.4 SD= 16.3); education measured as dummy variable for those with 
university education (46%) and with lower than university education (54%, reference group); 
social grade (ordered variable) is measured according to National Readership Survey (NRS) 
(A group 11%, B 26%, C1 30%, C2 12%, D 9%, E 12%); employment is a dummy variable 
with those being fully or partially employed (66%, otherwise is a reference group).  
Political variables: Party identification is measured by whether respondents could offer a 
clear sense of which party would earn their vote, given that the campaign had not started 
and the election was three months later this provides a sense of their partisan leaning. Party 
identification a dummy variable 1= having party identity (73%, otherwise is a reference 
group); Political discussion measured as dummy for those discussing politics with friends or 
family (51%, otherwise is a reference group) this is also used as a proxy for political interest. 
Results 
Modelling offline and online political participation 
In order to understand the role intrinsic and extrinsic motivations have, as well as the 
mediating role of mobilization attempts sent via social media by political parties, 
campaigning organizations and friends, regressions and path analysis were run separately 
for different participatory patterns. The offline and online participatory indexes are presented 
in models without mobilisation effects (models A) and with mobilisation effects (models B).  
The data from regression analysis shows that demographic characteristics have differential 
effects for explaining offline and online participatory patterns. Education remains a strong 
predictor, regardless of the participatory activities or mediation by encouragement, with 
those being more educated also engaging more. Gender is a significant explanatory 
characteristic for online activities only (males being marginally more active βRA (regression model A) 
=.067 p<.05). The gender effect is mediated, however, by mobilisation. When we take into 
account being encouraged to act online, the gender gap diminishes. This finding suggests 
males are slightly more likely to engage in political participation, but encouragement via 
social media may have a greater effect on females. As could be expected, age has a 
differing impacts depending on whether participation is offline or online, older respondents 
are definitely more likely to engage in traditional offline activities (βRA=.004 p<.05), 
surprisingly the effect is even stronger when receiving encouragement via social media 
(βRB=.006 p<.000). Age has no statistically significant impact on online participation 
suggesting that firstly, young people are more eager to engage online than offline, but also 
that age-related differences visible in earlier studies (Martin, 2012), most probably due to a 
generational digital divide (Hwang & Park, 2013), has diminished. The diminishing age gap 
may result from the greater ease of participating in online forms of political activism. Those 
from a lower social class tend to be less likely to engage in offline participation (βRA=-.027 
p<.05), the gap remains regardless of the source of mobilisation. As for online participation, 
social class is not significant in model A, however in model B encouragement via social 
media appears to offer the potential to mobilise lower class citizens into political participation 
online (βRB=.021 p=.07). As could be expected political variables (party identity and political 
discussion) play statistically significant and positive roles on participation rates regardless of 
the form of participation and independent of mediation by receiving encouragement. 
Table 1 here please 
We find interesting contrasts when exploring the explanatory power of the two motivational 
forces. While both sets of motivations have positive explanatory power for offline political 
participation, extrinsic motivations appear to be dominant. This is contrary to expectations. 
However, when focusing on online forms of political participation our expectations are 
confirmed by the significantly higher explanatory power of extrinsic motivations. However 
when mobilisation factors are included the significance of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations 
diminish, and for intrinsic motivations for online political participation they disappear entirely. 
We suggest therefore that while intrinsic and extrinsic motivations play a role they are 
heavily mediated by mobilisation, in particular those received from campaign organisations. 
Actions taken may, in fact, not have lasting personal significance, but rather they have 
immediate value resulting from a prompt from an organisation one feels close to. The 
explanatory power of party proximity, though significant across all models, may suggest 
parties are one but not the most important factor for encouraging political activism even in 
the lead up to a major national election. 
Hypotheses H1 suggests there should be a positive effect on participation from individuals’ 
motivations, regardless whether they are intrinsic or extrinsic, however previous studies 
suggest that  intrinsic motivations should be stronger than extrinsic at least for offline forms 
of political participation (Hypothesis H2). One may assume that self-efficacy or a feeling that 
individuals’ actions may influence policy or other citizens (IMI) or a feeling of group 
belonging and collective (connective) actions (EMI) have a positive and constant effect on 
engaging, regardless of any other variables. Furthermore, our assumption was that forms of 
mobilisation received from any actor (peers (social media friends) or organizations (political 
party, campaigning organization)) should have reinforcing power on the participatory 
activities. Thus we claim that the complementary effect of mediation, with statistically 
significant direct and indirect effects of motivations without/with encouragement should exist 
(Zhao et al 2010). Our data only partially confirms these hypotheses and complementary 
assumptions. 
We   find a stable, statistically significant, positive and non-mediated effect from extrinsic 
motivations on any forms of political participation (βRA=.019, βRB=.012 p <.000 for offline and 
βRA=.019, βRB=.012 p<.001 for online). The result is strong regardless whether participation 
takes place within an offline or online sphere, confirming hypothesis H2b, but particularly 
showing the importance of extrinsic motivations for driving online participatory actions. On 
the contrary, intrinsic motivations have more complex effects, being positive for offline 
participation (βRA=.010, βRB=.007 p <.001) but being mediated by social media mobilisation 
for online participation (βRA=.007 p<.01). Post-estimation tests indicate (F (1,1972) = 2.92 for 
offline and F= 3.52  for online) significantly stronger effects of extrinsic motivations over 
intrinsic motivations (in both models A), it remains significant for online participation but 
becomes non-significant for the offline participation (model B). Hypothesis 1 is thus only 
partially confirmed, as extrinsic motivations remains stable for both online and offline 
participation regardless of other factors, however intrinsic motivations lose their explanatory 
power for online activities once mediated by mobilisation efforts. Hypothesis 2a is not 
confirmed as it is extrinsic motivations, for both offline and online sphere, which have a 
greater explanatory power (H2b).  
The path analysis (Figures 1 and 2) offers a somewhat different perspective of the interplay 
between motivations and mobilisation factors. Again the higher explanatory power of 
extrinsic motivations is borne out, with intrinsic motivations for online forms of participation 
lacking significance while mediated (this refutes Hypothesis 3a). Therefore it appears that 
across all forms of political participation, people seek approval from others (in line with the 
H3b) rather than personal fulfilment. Feelings of personal efficacy or ‘feeling good’ are less 
significant in explaining online political engagement than ‘group belonging’ incentives. In 
many ways this is logical as it suggests that politics is a prosocial activity driven by a desire 
to have an impact on others as well as gaining rewards and recognition. Therefore, political 
participation might elicit positive feelings that lead to stronger intrinsic motivations however 
extrinsic motivations have the greater explanatory power. Furthermore while there is an 
indication that offline political participation is likely to be influenced by both intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations, online participation may be motivated primarily by seeking acceptance 
from other online users.  
Social media mobilisation 
Mobilisation through social media is discussed as having the potential to revitalise 
democratic participation. Comparing the simple average of the mobilization messages 
received by those who decided to engage (even in one, regardless of which, sphere of 
political activity) in comparison to those who remained passive, we see that on average 
those participating were twice as likely to have been mobilised (for passive: messages 
received from parties M=.68, from campaigning organization M=.77, from peers M=.83; for 
active: messages received from parties M=1.74, from organizations M=2.03, from peers 
M=1.92). The data on the potential effect of mobilisation via social media shows 
campaigning organizations’ messages have the strongest effects on both offline (βP=.210 
p<.000) and online (βP=.330 p<.000) activities. Although with significantly lower impact, 
peers seem to have minimal influence on both activities (βP=.059 p<.1 for offline and 
βP=.098 p<.05 for online). Surprisingly, encouragement received through social media from 
political parties has a weak, almost non-significant, positive effect (βP=.057 p=.096) on offline 
participation, while the effect is statistically non-significant for online participation (with a 
negative direction).  
We would argue that different sources having differing levels of influence, with campaigning 
organizations having a solid and stable impact. One might explain the differential influence 
levels by variances in the ties social media users have with political parties, campaign 
organizations and friends. We assume that to receive encouragement from any social media 
actors one needs to be connected into their network directly or via friends. It seems to be 
rare (with the exception for some specific cases e.g. journalists, partisans or potential trolls) 
that the average citizen would connect via social media (so providing an endorsement and 
giving the organization permission to contact them as well as being able to interact with the 
organization’s profile through likes, shares or comments) with organizations that she/he is 
not supporting (thus one may visit contra-ideological groups without leaving any trace of 
such visits).  
As for political party activists, they represent a small minority and party encouragements only 
circulate within bounded and homogenous networks. While within the context of an election 
party communication might be visible outside these networks, non-activists may be unwilling 
to engage with this because their network is largely non-partisan and so party-driven 
campaign may be perceived as unacceptable (Pattie & Johnson, 2009; Matthes, 2013). On 
the contrary, non-partisan campaign organizations’ campaigns lack, in most cases, the 
controversial and divisive partisan nature. These organizations also attempt to build broad 
communities and encourage the widest number of people to participate in online deliberation 
(commenting) or viral marketing (following or sharing) (Vesnic-Alujevic, 2012). The greater 
credibility and inclusive strategy may enable campaign organizations to extend their reach, 
gain credibility and have an impact on the media or public agenda (Norris & Curtice, 2008). 
As a consequence, the visibility campaign organizations gain demonstrates their social 
importance and level of support (Stefanone et al., 2012) driving further demonstrations of 
support. Hence, campaign organisations are most likely to encourage supporters to 
participate in offline engagement as well as building a large and engaged online audience. 
Our analysis confirms that the encouragement from campaign organizations is the most 
significant mediator.   
The weaker mediating power of the messages received from social media friends is 
surprising (Bond et al., 2012), however may be explained by the fact that social media users 
inhabit fairly heterogeneous communities, where one can be friends regardless of levels of 
agreement on political issues, even though un-friending during a public opinion flashpoint is 
an emerging phenomenon (John & Dvir‐Gvirsman, 2015). Therefore while one may see 
countervailing political messages, unless there is strong trust that disagreeing will not end 
the friendship or lead to hostility such encouragements will be more likely to be ignored 
(Matthes, 2013). Furthermore, if the network is highly heterogeneous friends may 
simultaneously send conflicting political messages thus neutralizing one another; as a 
consequence friends’ encouragements may have a lesser impact on political activity 
(Valenzuela et al., 2012).  
The low impact of political parties messages raises a question if, in fact, political parties 
focus almost exclusively on encouraging offline forms of participation, for example getting 
out their vote, especially during an election campaign, as well as encouraging their online 
supporters to join the party. Conversely, we know UK parties encourage sharing, if not 
debating (Author, 2014), but their networks, and particularly the number of activists in their 
networks are no more than 7,000 individuals (Author, 2016), therefore parties may lack the 
reach of campaign organisations as parties may have lower numbers of committed 
supporters. Alternatively, it is possible that low trust in political parties mediates the effect of 
their communication. Equally, as suggested earlier, social media users may not post partisan 
material for fear of receiving negative responses from within their heterogeneous and largely 
non-partisan social networks. Given the complexity it is impossible to test for all variables, 
however regardless of the causes, the weak or non-existent power of political parties in 
encouraging political participation confirms the complex relationship between social media 
users, their intrinsic and extrinsic motivations and those who seek to spur them to action via 
social media. 
Discussion 
Our findings show, consistent with Hypothesis 1, that regardless of the form or sphere of 
participation intrinsic and extrinsic motivations combined exert a positive influence on 
political participation. However contrary to Hypothesis 2 we did not identify different 
motivations within the different spheres, rather we found extrinsic motivations were the most 
significant drivers of participation regardless of the sphere. This finding suggests that the 
online and offline spheres may not be as different as some expect (Vissers & Stolte, 2014). 
Participation in both spheres are best explained by extrinsic motivational factors, although 
offline participation is more self-fulfilling while online participation appears to be concerned 
more with fitting in. Fitting in may offer some degree of fulfilment, suggesting that there may 
still be a link between intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors  (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). 
However, in evidencing that extrinsic motivations have greater explanatory power over 
participation occurring within the online sphere we can suggest that some of this behaviour 
is simple clicktivism: behaviour resulting from mobilisation but having little personal 
significance. While mobilisation does not increase the power of motivations, and in particular 
appears to have a negative effect on intrinsic motivations, we suggest that the mobilisation 
tactics pursued by political parties, campaign organisations and peers still have some effect 
in determining whether people participate in civically-oriented activities. However, within the 
online sphere, some social media users may follow a cue from campaign organisations, 
parties or peers in order to gain acceptance, such as a like from members of the network 
providing they feel the message will resonate with those who follow them (Deci et al., 1999; 
Vallerand & Lalande, 2011). This finding supports Hypothesis 3b, although the finding is 
strongest for campaign organisations. 
 Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, as previous studies suggest, play a complex role in 
influencing decisions to participate (Madden et al., 1992; Ryan & Deci, 2000b). However, 
within a UK political context it appears extrinsic motivations predominate (Grant, 2008; 
Omoto et al., 2010). Political activism is conducted to benefit others as well as to receive 
rewards and recognition (Degli-Antoni, 2009). But, realising goals and gaining recognition 
may well contribute to stronger intrinsic motivations that underpin a propensity to participate 
further. Arguably campaign organisations are most successful in using social media to offer 
the incentives most likely to mobilise their supporters. Through building communities they 
may inculcate positive motivations so that at the point of asking they are most successful in 
gaining positive responses to their requests. The persuasive power of campaign 
organisations may also result from their constant communication with supporters, unlike 
parties who are most active during elections and peers who may be sporadically active 
politically. However, at the point of acting online, the most important consideration may be 
whether the action fits to the norms of behaviour within a network; offline however involves 
also seeking self-fulfilment as well as gaining recognition. 
Campaign organisations do not simply reinforce extrinsic motivations for offline political 
participation however. Without in-depth research among individuals or a longitudinal panel 
study it is impossible to determine whether mobilisation strategies over time have a 
cumulative impact on the propensity to act. However, what our data may give an indication 
of is that campaign organisations not only encourage actions from their committed followers 
in order to spread the word but they can also encourage the belief that any action can 
simultaneously have a positive impact within the real world as well as on the individual 
through earning recognition and rewards. Hence messages that provide extrinsic motivations 
to act might, longer-term, and through the process of taking part in a collective action, 
contribute to strengthening intrinsic motivations by making who act feel good about 
themselves and gain a greater sense of self-efficacy (Vraga et al., 2015). Therefore 
campaign organizations have the propensity to channel the enthusiasm of the committed 
while also recruiting participants with low motivations who may be encouraged to act through 
accidental exposure. But both committed and single click-based groups may be spurred into 
pursuing a broader and deeper suite of participation that may lead to a deeper commitment 
to civically-oriented activity. Social media provides a space for organisations to communicate 
to a wide community, attract users to their communities and encourage actions; it also 
provides a space where users can dabble in activism. Our data suggests if there is some 
level of motivation and the right cue social media can provide a pathway into civic 
participation, but in the battle for hearts and action, campaign organisations have the edge in 
providing this pathway. 
Limitations 
As with any study based on a single country, cross-sectional survey, while there was a 
vibrant political culture in the lead up to the 2015 general election and significant debates 
surrounding the future of the union of nations, the relationship with the European Union and 
the best way to ameliorate the long-lasting effects of the global recession, there are limits to 
the generalizability  of the result for other countries. A panel study would be required in order 
to control for pure effects and the temporal consistency of motivations and mobilisation 
effects on political participation. The political context may also have led to somewhat higher 
levels of engagement, as well as higher levels of encouragement from a range of 
organizations and actors which might not be witnessed during a non-election period, 
especially from electoral organizations. Therefore we might suggest that some findings are 
exaggerated or that encouragement from friends via social media, in non-electoral periods, 
may play a more important role. In other words there are a number of communication and 
context variables that cannot be controlled for but which might impact on the results. 
The survey was also designed to ask about the respondents’ motivations for each individual 
form of participation. This produces two limitations, firstly the lack of a general question 
regarding the likelihood to participate regardless of the activity (so measuring holistically the 
propensity to be active). Secondly, given that the survey measured motivations for each 
individual action, when aggregated we lose the individual context of the data where any 
given action may have unique drivers. However, the consistency of results suggests we 
provide unique insights into the relationship between motivations, mobilisation strategies and 
behaviour which can form the basis for further research.  
A more sophisticated question relates to the receipt of encouragement from other means 
beyond social media. It was impossible to conceive of all the means by which campaign 
organizations, political parties or friends are able to interact with citizens in an attempt to 
mobilize them. We thus focused entirely on social media in this project, but with the 
understanding that any participation not explained by these forms of encouragement could 
arrive from other sources. Equally, even when considering social media as a prime route for 
persuasive communication, it may be the case that the relative homogeneity of the networks 
individuals inhabit may be a mediating factor on whether communication, in particular from 
friends, has a significant effect. However, overall, we find some interesting suggested routes 
to participation and indications of the power of differing sets of motivations. In particular the 
significance of the direct motivational pathways to participation may indicate that intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivations are strong predictors of political participation. If these findings 
appear controversial it is necessary to conduct further research to focus on these and other 
mediating factors, drawing on broader psycho-social perspectives (Klöckner, 2013) in order 
to provide even more holistic explanations for the variety of forms of political participation 
facilitated in the 21st Century. 
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Table 1: Regressions analysis for offline and online political participation 
 
Offline 
Model A 
Offline 
Model B 
Online 
Model A 
Online 
Model B 
SES         
Gender -.017 
 
-.031  .067 * .048  
Age .003 ** .006 *** -.000  .001  
University grade .174 *** .155 *** .171 *** .145 *** 
Social grade -.027 ** -.025 ** .019  .021 ✝ 
Employed .034  .015  -.014  -.035  
Political variables         
Party proximity .196 *** .153 *** .164 *** .134 *** 
Discuss politics .371 *** .344 *** .451 *** .401 *** 
Motivations         
Intrinsic .010 *** .006 ** .007 ** .001  
Extrinsic .018 *** .011 *** .019 *** .012 *** 
SM Encouragement         
from Political party   .049 **   .018  
from campaign organization     .120 ***   .206 *** 
from friends   .026    .003  
Constant -.626 *** -.673 *** -.505 *** -.526 *** 
Adj R2 .332  .377  .298  .362  
Note: OLS regression (robustness check by Poisson and negative binomial model: with the difference only for social grade being not 
statistically significant), Sample size N=1982, ✝<.1, *p<.05 **p<.01, ***p<.001. VIF: offline A 1.50; offline B 1.61; online A 1.43; online B 
1.57 
 
  
Figure 1: Path analysis of the motivations and encouragements on offline political participation 
 
  
NOTE: Sample size N=1982. Path entries are standardized SEM coefficients (β) ***p<.001 **p<.05 * p<.1 based on two-tailed Sobel test, 
bootstrap at a level of 2000 iterations. The model controls for effects of sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender, social class, 
employment, education) on exogenous and endogenous variables. Model goodness of fit: CMIN/DF = 3.000; CFI=.998; RMSEA=.032; 
PCLOSE=.994. R2offline participation =.34 
 
 Figure 2: Path analysis of the motivations and encouragements on online political participation 
 
NOTE: Sample size N=1982. Path entries are standardized SEM coefficients (β) ***p<.001 **p<.05 based on two-tailed Sobel test, 
bootstrap at a level of 5000 iterations. The model controls for effects of sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender, social class, 
employment, education) on exogenous and endogenous variables. Model goodness of fit: CMIN/DF = 3.655; CFI=.997; RMSEA=.037; 
PCLOSE=.968. R2online participation =.31 
 
 
  
Table 2: Effects of motivations and mobilisation via social media on political participation 
Intrinsic motivations 
 Direct no mediator → 
Offline political participation 
.258*** 
 Direct with mediator → .180*** 
→  SM Party → .010*** 
→ SM Organization → .059*** 
→  SM Friends → .012*** 
Extrinsic motivations 
 Direct no mediator → .239*** 
 Direct with mediator → .138*** 
→ SM Party → .022** 
→ SM Organization → .061*** 
→ SM Friends → .022*** 
Intrinsic motivations 
 
 Direct no mediator → 
Online political participation 
.168*** 
 Direct with mediator → .032 
→ SM Party → -.004 
→ SM Organization → .115*** 
→ SM Friends → .027*** 
Extrinsic motivations 
 
 Direct no mediator → .285*** 
 Direct with mediator → .157*** 
→ SM Party → -.004 
→ SM Organization → .098*** 
→ SM Friends → .040*** 
NOTE: Standardized regression coefficient multiplied by the effect of independent variable on mediator and mediator on dependent variable, with the 
exception for ‘no mediation’ coefficient. Sobel test of significance for indirect effects2-tailed **p<.05, ***p>.001 
  
Appendix  
Table 1: Spearman’s Rho correlations among different political online and offline activities  
 
Demonstra
tion 
Boycott Contact Joined 
party 
Follow 
party 
Follow 
NGO 
Shared 
content 
Boycotted a company or product ρ =.398* 
      Contacted an elective representative  .421* .346* 
     Joined a political party .585* .359* .431* 
    Follow political party/MP/candidate on SM .271* .261* .315* .290* 
   Follow political NGO on SM .239* .353* .334* .204* .431* 
  Shared political content on SM .268* .297* .276* .249* .433* .482* 
 Commented about politics on SM .216* .303* .253* .183* .437* .447* .614* 
NOTE Spearman’s Rho correlations, statistical significance *p<.000 2-tailed 
 
 
Appendix Table 2: Indexes of offline and online political participation 
   
CFA  
Online 
CFA  
Offline 
Commented about politics on SM   .682  
Shared political content on SM   .648  
Follow political NGO on SM   .737  
Follow political party/MP/candidate on SM   .620  
Joined a political party    .555 
Taken part in a demonstration    .575 
Contacted an elective representative    .737 
Boycotted a company or product    .688 
Note: for CFA standardized  estimates are indicated. Cronbach alpha: offline .782 online .714; CFI = .986; RMSEA =.046; PCLOSE =.706 
 
 
 
